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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
FRASER v. BETHEL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT: NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS A 
STUDENT'S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fraser v. Bethel School District, l the Ninth Circuit held 
that a school district violated a student's first amendment rights 
by punishing him for his use of sexual innuendo in a student 
election campaign speech. II The court refused to extend Federal 
Communication Commission v. Paci/ica3 to a high school 
environment.4 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision issuing 
a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff and enjoining the school 
district from prohibiting plaintiff from speaking at his gradua-
tion.1I The plaintiff was awarded $278 as damages and $12,750 
for costs and attorney's fees.' 
1. 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Norris, J.j the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J., and Wright, J.), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 2463 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1985) (No. 
84-1667). 
2. 755 F.2d at 1365. 
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1976). A radio station aired comedian George Carlin's "Filthy 
Words" dialogue at two o'clock in the afternoon. Responding to a parent complaint, the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) found the radio station in violation of a stat-
ute prohibiting the broadcast of indecent speech. The Supreme Court, in a plurality 
opinion, held that the FCC regulation of indecent speech was constitutional under the 
first amendment. The seven words to which the FCC took offense were fuck, shit, piss, 
motherfucker, cocksucker, cunt and tit. Id. at 751. 
4. 755 F.2d at 1363. 
5. Id. at 1357. Although Fraser's name had been removed from the election ballot, 
he was elected as a write-in candidate. Id. 
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II. FACTS 
In Fraser the plaintiff was Matthew Fraser, a seventeen-
year-old high school senior at Bethel High School in Tacoma, 
Washington.' During a student run assembly, he nominated a 
friend for school office by delivering the following speech: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, 
he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but 
most of all his belief in you, the students of 
Bethel is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes 
his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take 
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack 
things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man 
who will go to the very end-even the climax, for 
each and everyone of you. So vote for Jeff for 
ASB vice president-he'll never come between 
you and the best our school can be.8 
The day after the speech, Fraser was charged by defendant 
Bethel School District with violating the school's disruptive con-
duct rule.9 He was suspended for three days and his name was 
removed from the graduation speaker ballot. Fraser filed a griev-
ance of disciplinary action with the Superintendent of Bethel 
School District. When the grievance was denied, Fraser brought 
a civil rights action in district court. Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court held that the school district had vio-
lated Fraser's rights under the first amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act.10 Defendants ap-
7. Id. at 1357. The majority noted that Fraser was an honor student and a member 
of the school's debate team. He had also won "Top Speaker" award in a statewide com-
petition for two consecutive years. Id. 
Id. 
8.ld. 
9. Id. at 1357 n.l. The school's rule as published in the student handbook stated: 
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission 
of, or participation in certain non-criminal activities or acts 
may lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these are acts 
which disrupt and interfere with the educational process. 
Disruptive conduct: Conduct which materially and substan-
tially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, in-
cluding the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 
10. 1d. at 1358. 
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pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The first amendment of the United States Constitution 
states: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech."Il This seemingly broad statement has been defined 
and tailored by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Terminiello v. Chicago, III the Supreme Court recognized 
that a speech often serves its most important function when it 
shocks its audience or stirs unrest.13 In reversing a breach of the 
peace conviction where an abrasive speaker had incited an angry 
crowd, the Court emphasized that speech is often challenging 
and provocative but is nevertheless protected, since one major 
purpose of the free speech clause is to protect speech that in-
vites dispute." 
The emotive function of speech was recognized in Cohen v. 
Ca lifornia ,111 a case considering offensive speech. The Supreme 
Court held that offensive speech is protected under the first 
amendment. It stated that offensive speech may not be regu-
lated merely because the state wishes to eliminate such words to 
protect public morality. IS However, the Cohen majority ex-
pressly excluded obscenity from this protection, adhering to the 
Court's previous holding determining obscenity to be unpro-
tected speech under the first amendment.17 
11. u.s. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is made applicable to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 287 U.S. 233, 
244 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
12. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). A speaker in an auditorium caused several disturbances in a 
crowd gathered outside the auditorium to protest the speech. The speaker was convicted 
with violating a breach of the peace ordinance. The trial court had instructed the jury 
that speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of 
unrest or creates a disturbance" violated the ordinance. The Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court. I d. at 3-5. 
13. ld. at 4. 
14. ld. at 6. 
15. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Appellant had been convicted for "maliciously and willfully 
disturbing the peace of any neighbor or person ... by ... offensive conduct," for wear-
ing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" while in a courthouse hall. The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction. ld. at 16. 
16. ld. at 24. 
17. ld. at 20. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (guidelines describing 
obscenity as: (a) whether an average person, applying contemporary community stan-
3
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In considering "indecent" speech, the Court has retreated 
from its trend of protection at least where that speech occurs in 
the context of broadcasting. For example, in Federal Communi-
cation Commission u. Paci/ica I8 the Court held that indecent 
speech that is patently offensive may be regulated even though 
it is not legally obscene.I9 
Historically, protection of first amendment rights has also 
been applied to schools. In West Virginia u. Barnette,20 the Su-
preme Court stated that the function of the Bill of Rights is to 
protect citizens against the state and all its creations, including 
boards of education. U The Court held that under the first 
amendment, public school students could not be compelled to 
salute the flag. 22 Their analysis included a balancing approach 
which considered the school's function as an educator and the 
students' right to exercise their freedom of expression without 
state control. 23 
Another case which has helped define students' rights to 
freedom of speech is Tinker u. Des Moines School District.24 
The Court there held that high school students did not shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the high 
school gate.2& The Court did, however, limit the protection of 
student speech to that which did not materially disrupt class-
work,' or involve substantial disorder, or invade the rights of 
dards would find that the work as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether 
the work describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by state law; 
and (c) whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific 
value); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (states may regulate com-
merce in obscene material and exhibition of obscene material in places of public ac-
comodation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected 
speech under the first amendment). 
18. 438 U.S. 726 (1976). 
19. Id. at 750-51. For the majority the term, "patently offensive" meant words that 
have no intrinsic value and refer to sexual and excretory organs. Id. at 732 (citing In re 
Citizen's Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975». 
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
21. Id. at 637. 
22. Id. at 642. 
23. Id. at 638-40. 
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court held, inter alia, that high school students who 
wore black armbands in school to protest the Vietnam War could not be punished for 
doing so under the first amendment. Id. at 514. 
25. Id. at 506. 
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others.26 It established that a student's right to expression must 
be defined by considering the special functions of the school. 27 
Freedom of speech was recognized as vital in the context of 
American public schools.28 The classroom itself was deemed to 
be a marketplace of ideas.29 
The Supreme Court recently stated in Board of Education 
v. Pico sO that teachers and school officials must be given broad 
discretion over decisions concerning the education of students, 
but that this discretion must be limited by the imperatives of 
the first amendment. SI In addition, that case limited the school 
officials' discretion to curriculum decisions within the confines of 
the classroom.s2 Once the school officials' decisions were deemed 
to be curriculum decisions, and constitutional values were impli-
cated, the Court used a balancing approach in its analysis. The 
Court balanced the students' right to free speech with the 
school's function of educating students,Ss much like the original 
approach in Barnette.s• 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in the context of the 
school environment, the first amendment does not prohibit 
26. [d. at 509. The majority stated that students cannot be regarded as "closed-
circuit recipients" of only the materials which school officials or the state wished to com-
municate. It also stated that "state operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism." [d. at 511. 
27. [d. at 506. 
28. [d. at 512. 
29. [d. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967». 
30. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
31. [d. at 864. 
32. [d. at 863. In Pica, the library was not considered the compulsory confinement 
of the classroom, therefore, it was not subject to regulation with absolute discretion by 
school officials. [d. 
33. [d. at 869-72. The circuit court decisions have not been clear in defining what 
falls within the scope of school curriculum. Compare Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 
(3rd Cir. 1981) (school play, sponsored by school in evening hours considered part of 
school curriculum) and Trachman V. Arker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977) (student poll of 
students' sexual knowledge, preference, and experience, to be published in school news-
paper was part of the curriculum) with Thomas V. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2nd 
Cir. 1979) (student-published "indecent" publication not printed or sold within school 
was not part of school curriculum). 
34. 319 U.S. at 638-40. 
5
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school officials from disciplining students who materially disrupt 
the educational process.3Ci It continued, however, to outline some 
limits that school districts must adhere to when first amend-
ment rights are implicated. Specifically, the court discussed 
whether Fraser's speech was indecent, and if so, whether that 
exempted it from first amendment protection. 
First, the court concluded that the only first amendment 
standard appropriate in this application was the material dis-
ruption test articulated in Tinker u. Des Moines School Dis-
trict.38 A test involving a judgment of the "appropriateness" of 
speech by school administrators was expressly rejected by the 
majority.37 It noted that the mere fact that teachers or adminis-
trators disapproved of the speech did not necessarily mean that 
the educational process had been disrupted.3s The court fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tinker, that unless 
the student's behavior rose to a level of material interference 
with the educational process, it did not justify the infringement 
on the student's right to freedom of expression.39 
The court also concluded that although the first amendment 
allows school officials to discipline students who materially dis-
rupt the educational process, the testimony offered by the school 
district was insufficient to show that Fraser had materially dis-
rupted classwork.40 The court found that the Bethel School Dis-
35. 755 F.2d at 1359. 
36. [d. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). See 
supra text accompanying notes 19-24. 
37. 755 F.2d at 1361. In the district court, the testimony of both the principal and 
vice-principal expressed that, in their views, the word "inappropriate" was synonymous 
with "disruptive" in the context of the school. [d. 
38. [d. at 1363. 
39. [d. at 1360. 
40. Id. at 1359. The following testimony is from a teacher, Irene Hicks, describing 
the students' reaction to Fraser's speech: 
A: The best way to describe it, I think, is mixed. There were 
pockets of loud clapping, hoots and hollering and then there 
were other students that were sitting there, I guess my best 
words to describe it is as rather bewildered, not understanding 
what the kids were clapping about and why there was such a 
difference in reception to the speech. 
Gary McCutcheon, a school counselor, also described what he heard at the assembly: 
Q: Let's first go with what did you hear from the student 
body? 
A: Not too dissimilar to what Mrs. Hicks just reported, the 
students were pockets of high volume conversations hooting, 
6
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trict had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Fra-
ser's use of sexual innuendo in his speech had substantially 
disrupted or materially interfered with the educational process.41 
There were several factors that the court found significant 
in making this determination.42 The fact that Fraser's speech 
did not delay the assembly and that school administrators were 
able to maintain order without any difficulty suggested that 
there had been no disruption.43 Even though the speech evoked 
much hooting and yelling in the audience, it was found to be a 
typical reaction in a high school auditorium and, therefore, not 
unduly disruptive." Moreover, the court found that although 
the speech was a popular topic of conversation among students 
during classes on the following day, that was not significant 
enough to amount to a material disruption.4Ii 
Second, the Ninth Circuit found the Supreme Court's ratio-
nales in Federal Communications Commision u. Pacifica,4e 
which sanctioned government regulation of indecent speech, in-
applicable to a high school assembly.47 Bethel School District 
had argued that if the FCC could keep indecent language off the 
air in the afternoon, then a school district could keep indecent 
language from circulating in a high schooVs even if it did not 
[d. 
41. [d. 
yelling, which is not atypical to a high school auditorium as-
sembly and the auditory, the sounds were not too dissimilar to 
any auditorium sounds I have heard over the many assemblies 
I have been at Bethel High School. 
Q: Were there physical activities as well? 
A: I think of particular interest might be perhaps was some-
thing I hadn't seen before. I had seen one student on the side 
of the bleachers where I was sitting actually simulate mastur-
bation and two students on the opposite bleachers were simu-
lating the sexual intercourse movements with hips. 
42. [d. at 1360. The court found Fraser indistinguishable from Tinker on the issue 
of disruption. The court reasoned that just as the record in Tinker failed to show that 
wearing the black armbands interfered with school activities, the record here failed to 
show that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo in his speech interfered with the activities at 
Bethel High School. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 1361. 
46. 438 U.S. 726 (1976). 
47. 755 F.2d at 1363. 
48. [d. at 1361 (citing Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2nd Cir. 
7
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disrupt classwork. The court distinguished Pacifica by empha-
sizing that broadcasting received the most limited first amend-
ment protection for two reasons: (1) it intrudes into the privacy 
of the home of an unwilling listener,'9 and (2) it is available to 
unsupervised children, even those too young to read. CiO 
The first rationale, that broadcasting is intrusive upon the 
privacy of the home, was found clearly inapplicable to the volun-
tary high school assembly in Fraser. The majority reasoned that 
while the Supreme Court has given homes a higher level of pri-
vacy protection,Cil by comparison, a high school assembly is a 
very public place. Thus, the students, who voluntarily attended 
this assembly to hear campaign speeches, did not expect the 
same level of privacy that they would have expected in their 
homes.Ci2 
The court found that the second rationale in Pacifica was 
also inapplicable since the speech in issue was not made to chil-
dren too young to read, but to young adults who were very near 
the voting age. Concluding, the court stated that, "Realistically, 
high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered 
from the potpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at every 
turn in our daily lives. "Ci3 
Third, the court concluded that the school officials did not 
have unlimited discretion to prohibit speech which they deemed 
"indecent."Ci' It reasoned that although school officials have 
broad discretion in controlling the content of school curricu-
lum, CiCi Fraser's speech was not made as part of the school curric-
ulum. CiS The court found the school district's reliance on Board 
of Education v. PicoCi7 misplaced. Ci8 Pico was not controlling in 
this case because it had stated that school boards could not ex-
1979) (Newman, J., concurring)). 
49. 755 F.2d at 1362. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
52. 755 F.2d at 1362. 
53. Id. at 1363. 
54.Id. 
55. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982). 
56. 755 F.2d at 1364. 
57. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
58. 755 F.2d at 1364. 
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tend their absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environ-
ment of the classroom. &9 Thus, the majority argued, a fortiori, 
that a high school assembly was not the environment of the 
classroom, emphasizing the voluntary nature of the assembly.60 
Finally, the court stressed that Fraser's speech must be es-
pecially protected since it was of a political nature, made in the 
context of the student government process.61 It found that the 
speech was made under the protection of the first amendment, 
since it was delivered in a forum where students were invited to 
express their political views.62 
B. THE DISSENT 
Justice Wright, dissenting, argued that the Tinker material 
disruption test was inapplicable in the context of indecent 
speech.68 He reasoned that Tinker was concerned with pure po-
litical speech in which there is an expectation that schools re-
main neutral. 64 In contrast, the Bethel School's regulation of 
Fraser's speech was only concerned with the indecent manner in 
which the idea was expressed, rather than its particular 
viewpoint.6& 
The dissent argued that even if the Tinker standard were 
applied it would conclude that the educational process had been 
disrupted. It pointed out that a speech which caused students to 
become distracted, excited or embarrassed could interfere with 
the school's educational function just as much as would the out-
break of a fight.66 It also stated that it would be unwise for 
courts to second -guess the judgment of school authorities in de-
59. Id. See also Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (limiting school authorities' discretion to the 
compulsory environment of the classroom). 
60. 755 F.2d at 1364. 
61. Id. at 1365. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 1369. The dissent deferred to the school authorities' judgment which in· 
terpreted Fraser's speech to be "indecent." Id. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. The plurality opinion stated, "A re-
quirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, 
rather than the content of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that 
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id. 
66. 755 F.2d at 1364 (citing Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: 
The Case Against Judicial Intervention, '59 TEx, L. REV. 477, 496-510 (1981». 
9
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ciding when the educational process had been disrupted.s7 
The dissent based most of its argument on the conclusion 
that Fraser's speech was made as part of the school curriculum, 
therefore, giving school authorities greater discretion in its regu-
lation. It stressed that the speech was made during school hours 
as a school sponsored event.SS Students were required to attend 
unless they went to a study hall.6D Also, the dissent stressed the 
fact that the speech was delivered as part of the official school 
curriculum designed to teach students rhetoric and leadership.70 
The dissent also focused on the nature of the school envi-
ronment and the special demands of schools in educating stu-
dents, arguing that it necessitated special treatment for first 
amendment purposes.71 The physically confining nature of the 
school and the immaturity of the students raised captive audi-
ence concerns.72 Under a captive audience analysis, it was rele-
vant that the students were not warned that sexual innuendo 
would be used in the speeches and that it was difficult for stu-
dents to leave once they entered the auditorium.73 
The fact that the speech was made to minors was deemed 
very significant, since the dissent argued that more limits on 
speech are permissible when speech is aimed at children rather 
than adults.74 It supported this argument by stating that school 
authorities stood in loco parentis, having the duty to enforce 
minimum standards of student expression.711 It concluded by 
stressing the school's role as an inculcator of societal values with 
the power to instill the values of citizenship, discipline and ac-
ceptable morals.76 
67. Id. at 1369-70 (citing Diamond, supra note 66, at 486). 
68. 755 F.2d at 1366. 
69. Id. at 1367. 
70. Id. at 1366, 1368. 





76. Id. at 1370. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit correctly limited Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. Pacifica" to its facts by refusing to apply 
its rationales to a high school assembly. The Pacifica decision 
was premised on the special nature of broadcasting. The facts 
that offensive speech intruded into the privacy of the home and 
that it could reach unsupervised children were necessary in 
reaching the Pacifica Court's result. Neither of these two ratio-
nales were implicated in Fraser. 
In Fraser, the speech was delivered in a public school, as a 
political expression in support of a particular candidate running 
for school office.78 It was directed at an audience of students ap-
proximately between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.79 The 
purpose of Fraser's speech was to persuade the voting student 
body to support his candidate. He made a politically tactical de-
cision by appealing to his audience's sense of humor via sexual 
innuendo to make his point. Although it may have been a risky 
choice, it was one that ultimately proved successful. 80 
Fraser is also distinguishable from Pacifica in that the lat-
ter specifically focused on the nature of the "patently offensive" 
language there existent. Each word was inherently offensive, 
particularly the seven "filthy words" in George Carlin's mono-
77. 438 U.S. 726 (1976). 
78. 755 F.2d at 1365. 
79. For a discussion regarding the maturity and intellectual sophistication of high 
school students, see Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 826 (1970). The Seventh Circuit, analysing the effect of the statement "Oral sex 
may prevent toothdecay," noted that "[tjhis attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an 
older generation. But today's students in high school are not insulated from the shocking 
but legally accepted language used by demonstrators and protestors in streets and on 
campuses and by authors of best-selling modern literature." See also Nahmod, First 
Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 
WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1491 (1972) (noting that Tinker and underground newspaper cases 
suggest that difference between the maturity of high school and college students is no 
longer clear); Note, Tinker Goes to the Theater: First Amendment Rights and High 
School Theatrical Productions in Seyfried v. Walton, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 275-
78 (1984) (arguing that courts should take judicial notice of the age and maturity of high 
school students); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious 
Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983) (discussing adolescents' 
psychological maturity and concluding that adolescents may have a high "tolerance of a 
diversity of views and an approval of First Amendment free speech values."). 
80. 755 F.2d at 1363 n.9. Fraser's candidate was subsequently elected. Id. 
11
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logue.81 On the other hand, the language at issue in Fraser's 
speech was merely innuendo, verbal imagery in the form of a 
poem.82 This type of language would be the most dangerous to 
regulate because o(its abstract nature and because of the diffi-
culty in separating the words from the ultimate message meant 
to be conveyed. 
It has been asserted by some, including the majority in Co-
hen, that it cannot be assumed that content and form of lan-
guage are somehow separable.8s The Supreme Court in Cohen 
recognized that words serve an important emotive, as well as a 
cognitive, function.84 Purifying public discourse may exclude 
from the marketplace of ideas those messages that may only be 
expressed in the language of the street.811 As Justice Harlan 
stated for the Cohen majority, "One man's vulgarity is another's 
lyric."88 
Bethel School District argued that schools have the author-
ity to regulate language which school authorities find offensive.87 
This is precisely the kind of argument that the Cohen majority 
rejected.88 Unless the state is to ignore the Cohen decision, it 
cannot constitutionally prohibit offensive speech outside the 
area of broadcasting. School boards as creatures of the state are 
also forbidden from interfering within the realm of protected 
speech.89 The only exceptions to first amendment protection 
which are relevant in the area of offensive speech are obscenity, 
fighting words, and captive audience concerns. 
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751. 
82. 755 F.2d at 1363. Note that even if such verbal imagery were deemed to be le-
gally obscene, the court would still consider whether "the work taken as a whole, lacks 
8erious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 24 (1973). 
83. 403 U.S. at 26. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-10 
at 619 (1978) (discussing the Cohen opinion with approval). 
84. 403 U.S. at 26. 
85. Id. at 25. 
86.Id. 
87. 755 F.2d at 1361. 
88. 403 U.S. at 25. The Cohen majority discussed the difficulty in determining which 
words were "offensive." It stated that because the concept of "offensiveness" is so limit-
less, the Constitution "leaves matters of taste and style ... largely to the individual." 
Id. 
89. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943». 
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The School District did not contend that Fraser's speech 
was obscene under the current legal definition.90 Nor was there 
any suggestion by the defendants that the speech consisted of 
"fighting words."91 The Fraser court did consider the captive au-
dience issue.92 In general, audience complaint appears to be an 
important factor when considering the captive audience issue. In 
Pacifica, the FCC was responding to a listener's vigorous com-
plaint regarding George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue. 
The Pacifica majority noted this, contrasting Cohen where there 
were no objecting citizens who had taken offense at the defend-
ant's "Fuck the Draft" inscription on his jacket.93 As in Cohen, 
those being allegedly protected from the "offensive" speech in 
Fraser had not themselves objected. For that matter, neither 
had their parents.9" The record in Fraser reflects only the testi-
mony of a few school authorities who had complained about the 
speech.911 Under a Pacifica captive audience analysis this would 
not be a sufficient basis for labeling Fraser's audience as 
captive.96 
The dissent in Fraser made the tenuous argument that, 
since students only had the choice of going to a study hall rather 
than to the assembly, they were captive.97 The dissent seems to 
suggest that the students' decision was an involuntary one. Ar-
guably, the captive audience exception does not solely require an 
application of a traditional voluntariness test. The Cohen major-
ity defined a captive audience by stating that "substantial pri-
vacy interests" must be invaded in an "intolerable manner."98 In 
Fraser, there was no evidence showing that the privacy interest 
of the student audience had been invaded in an intolerable 
manner. 
Courts must begin their speech regulation analysis with the 
premise that government cannot justify the suppression of 
speech merely because its content or form is offensive to some 
90. 755 F.2d at 1361 n.5. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. at 1364-65. 
93. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1976». 
94. 755 F.2d at 1361 n.4. 
95. [d. at 1361. 
96. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 n.25. 
97. 755 F.2d at 1367 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
98. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
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members of the audience.99 Fraser's political speech should be 
especially protected in the context of the school environment 
since schools have been deemed special marketplaces of ideas. loo 
The future of our nation depends on leaders trained through the 
exposure to a "robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
'out of a multitude of tongues.' "101 If the school is able to sup-
press speech at its whim, especially in the political context, stu-
dents will be denied the opportunity to develop their political 
character in a meaningful way. 
By teaching basic communication skills, as well as knowl-
edge and patterns of thinking, schools prepare students to exer-
cise those political freedoms which are at the core of a demo-
cratic society. Bethel High School was actually training its 
students for a role in a democratic society when it allowed them 
to make speeches regarding upcoming candidates in the school's 
election. l02 When a school punishes a student for delivering such 
a political speech, it sends the message that the free flow of 
ideas is not truly permitted. The result would be to covertly in-
culcate the school's questionable value system.103 At a minimum, 
the exchange of ideas in the context of education makes the 
casting of a ballot more meaningfu1.104 It may also motivate stu-
dents to develop interests in public issues which may trigger in-
volvement in other civic and political activities. lOll 
It would be unacceptable to democratic values to allow the 
government, through school boards, to regulate speech on the 
basis of its perceived merits. What should be considered instead 
is the relative importance of the interests involved. l08 In Fraser, 
the interests were political expression and free speech vis-a-vis 
the educational process. The value of freedom of expression in 
this case greatly outweighs any interest the school may have as 
99. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
101. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States 
v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). 
102. 755 F.2d at 1365. 
103. See Arons and Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First 
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 317 (1980). 
104. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 608, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 
618 (1971). 
105. ld. 
106. See Scanlon Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. 
PITI'. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (1979). 
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long as the educational process is not disrupted under a Tinker 
standard.107 In Fraser, the educational process was not so 
disrupted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Fraser, the Ninth Circuit properly struck a balance in 
favor of the student's right to free speech. Neither the student 
audience's privacy expectations, nor the school authorities' feel-
ings of discomfort outweigh the student's right to freedom of ex-
pression under the first amendment. 
Maria Mandolini-Astengo* 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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BUNYAN V. CAMACHO: GUAM'S RETIREMENT CREDIT 
STATUTE FAILS EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Bunyan v. Camacho l the Ninth Circuit held that a stat-
ute2 granting retroactive retirement credit only to local govern-
ment employees who were Guam residents prior to starting col-
lege, violated the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution.3 The court found that the statute was not ration-
ally related to any legitimate governmental purpose.· 
1. 770 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were Sneed, 
J., and Rafeedie, D.J., Central District of California, sitting by designation). 
2. The statute in issue states as follows: 
Any bona fide resident of Guam who receives his graduate or 
undergraduate degree from an accredited institution and is 
employed by the government of Guam, after obtaining such 
degree, may claim retirement credit equal to the period of 
time, including vacations, which a full-time student would 
normally take to complete the program leading to the degree 
he received, ... by paying to the Fund the appropriate mem-
ber's and employer's shares ... , provided, however, that this 
section shall apply only to those persons: 
(a) who received their degrees after June I, 1945; 
(b) who were bona fide residents of Guam at the time they 
began their undergraduate studies; and 
(c) who had been employed by the Government for at least ten 
(10) years as full-time, locally hired employees. 
4 Guam Code Ann. § 8113 (1983). 
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The plaintiff was William K. Bunyan, a high school science 
teacher, who had moved to Guam in 1963, after completing col-
lege.6 He met all of the statutory requirements to be eligible for 
retroactive retirement credit except that he had not been a 
Guam resident at the time he began college.s 
Plaintiff brought a civil rights action7 against the members 
of the Board of Trustees for the Government of Guam Retire-
ment Fund.8 The district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants,9 finding that the statute, as applied to persons 
already employed by the government, was rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose. IO That purpose was the ex-
pression of gratitude by the Territory of Guam to those resi-
dents who had gone to college, graduated and returned to Guam 
"with their specialized knowledge, skill, and training to work for 
the Government of Guam, prior to the enactment of this stat-
ute."l1 Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit.12 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit initiated its analysis by recognizing that 
absent a suspect classification or the infringement of a funda-
mental right, the equal protection clause would be violated only 
if the difference in treatment between the two classes of govern-
ment employees did not bear a rational relationship to any legit-
imate governmental purpose. IS It found the district court's reli-
ance on Devereaux v. New York Teachers' Retirement Boardl4 
misplaced. 111 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the reccent trend in equal 
5. [d. at 774. 
6. [d. 
7. [d. This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1982). 





13. [d. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
14. 75 A.D.2d 277, 429 N.Y.S.2d 743, appeal denied, 51 N.Y.2d 705 (1980). The 
Devereaux court found that it was a legitimate state purpose for New York to express 
gratitude to its citizens who had served in the military by conferring benefits on them to 
which others were not entitled. 75 A.D.2d at 281·82, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 747. 
15. 770 F.2d at 775. 
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protection analysis is to restrict the types of past contributions 
which may be rewarded, as well as the bases for distinguishing 
between classes which are rewarded and those which are not. IS It 
then pointed out that the defendants had failed to cite any case 
in which a reward for past contribution had been upheld for any 
service other than military.17 The court also cited two cases de-
cided after the district court's ruling that cast doubt on the con-
stitutionality of distinguishing on the basis of residency. IS 
In the first case, Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service 
Commission,19 the Second Circuit held that favoring prior state 
residents when rewarding citizens for participating in military 
service was not a legitimate state purpose.20 In addition, the 
court found the distinction between veterans who had been resi-
dents at the time they entered the military and those who had 
not, was not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose.21 
The United States Supreme Court, in the second case, 
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,22 invalidated a statute 
that granted Vietnam veterans partial tax exemption only if 
they had been state residents prior to May 8, 1976.28 The Court 
held that rewarding only prior reside~ts is not a legitimate state 
16. [d. (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982» and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969». In Zobel, the State of Alaska had imposed a statutory scheme under 
which it distributed the income derived from its vast natural resources to its residents in 
varying amounts, based upon length of residency. The state attempted to justify the 
distinctions it had created by stating that the scheme's purpose was to apportion bene-
fits in recognition of undefined contributions of various kinds which residents may have 
made during their residency. However, the Supreme Court ruled that rewarding resi-
dents for such past contributions was not a legitimate state purpose. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 
61. 
Shapiro involved a durational residency requirement under which a state resident 
was ineligible to receive welfare assistance until he had resided in the state for at least 
one year. The state argued that the classification should be sustained as an atttempt to 
distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they had 
made through the payment of taxes. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that such an 
apportionment of state services violated the equal protection clause. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 
633. 
17. 770 F.2d at 775. 
18. [d. 
19. 755 F.2d 266 (2nd Cir.) prob. juris. noted sub nom. Attorney General of New 
York v. Soto-Lopez, 105 S. Ct. 3523 (1985), argued 54 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1986) 
(No. 84-1803). 
20. 755 F.2d at 274. 
21. [d. at 277. 
22. 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985). 
23. [d. at 2869. 
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purpose.24 Furthermore, it found that a distinction between resi-
dents based on when they arrived in the state bore no rational 
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of compensating res-
ident veterans for wartime services.1I11 
Relying on Soto-Lopez and Hooper, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the Guam statute in issue was based on an impermis-
sible distinction between two classes of residents. 26 The court 
determined that there was no legitimate purpose in rewarding 
established residents for the same conduct for which more re-
cent residents were not rewarded.27 
The court also found that even if the bona fide resident re-
quirement of the statute did have a legitimate state purpose, its 
distinction between classses of resident civil servants was not ra-
tionally related to the object of the statute.1I8 The court ex-
plained that the asserted goal of "rewarding, encouraging and 
compensating persons for the alleged sacrifices" of completing a 
higher education would not be furthered in any way by distin-
guishing resident civil servants who had not resided in Guam at 
the time they entered college from those who had.29 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit, using minimal scrutiny in its equal pro-
tection analysis, invalidated the bona fide resident requirement 
of the Guam statute. In addition to finding an illegitimate state 
purpose, the court closely analyzed the relationship of the stat-
ute to the alleged state purpose and correctly concluded that 
there was no rational basis in distinguishing between Guam resi-
dents who had resided in Guam upon entering college and those 
who had not.30 This ruling means that in the future all Guam 
government employees who have worked for the government for 
at least ten years and who received their college degrees after 
24. Id. at 2868-69. 
25. Id. at 2867. 
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June 1, 1945, will be uniformly rewarded by receiving retroactive 
retirement credit for time spent attending college. 
Maria Mandolini-Astengo* 
·Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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